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How Smart Is Too Smart?: How
Privacy Concerns Threaten Modern
Energy Infrastructure
ABSTRACT
Smart meters are integral to the health of our electric grid and
are critical to a reliable, affordable, and efficient energy economy. Yet,
collection of smart meter data is raising privacy concerns that are
inspiring pockets of resistance to smart meter installation around the
country. The fact that these data, like many other kinds of personal
information, can and often do flow to the government should not
prevent their collection and use. It is critical for environmental and
energy regulators to have access to this data to maximize the potential
of our energy system. On the state level, several egislatures and Public
Utility Commissions (PUCs) have enacted a variety of rules and
regulations designed to balance privacy concerns with smart grid
goals. But by looking beyond trade-offs between privacy and smart
meter installation, this Note recognizes an opportunity to protect
reasonable xpectations of privacy without hampering the ability of the
smart grid to reach its full potential. This can be accomplished by
shifting the conversation from regulation of smart meter installation to
regulation of smart data distribution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To celebrate the new millennium, the National Academy of
Engineering identified the most important engineering achievements
of the twentieth century. The Internet ranked thirteenth on this list,
and "highways" were eleventh.1 Sitting at the top of the list was
something most Americans encounter each day with the flick of a
switch or the click of a button. Electrification, as made possible by the
grid, was far and away "the most significant engineering achievement
of the 20th century.'2
However, we have taken this marvelous machine for granted
for far too long. As a result, our overburdened grid is struggling to
keep up with our increasingly large, complex energy demands and is
desperately in need of an upgrade. In 2009, President Obama
announced the largest single grid modernization investment in US
history.3 The Smart Grid Investment Grant (SGIG) program seeks to
accelerate the transformation of the nation's electric grid by deploying
smart grid technologies and infrastructure. Under the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ("Recovery Act"), the US
Department of Energy (DOE) and the electricity industry jointly
invested over $7.8 billion in ninety-nine cost-shared SGIG projects.4
1. See generally GEORGE CONSTABLE & BOB SOMERVILLE, A CENTURY OF INNOVATION:
TWENTY ENGINEERING ACHIEVEMENTS THAT TRANSFORMED OUR LIVES (Joseph Henry Press,
2003).
2. Id.
3. See The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 § 1301, 42 U.S.C. § 17381
(2007).
4. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY DELIVERY, SMART
GRID INVESTMENT GRANT PROGRAM PROGRESS REPORT 7 (July 2012), https://www.smartgrid.gov/
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With funds provided by the Recovery Act, thirty-two municipalities,
including Los Angeles, Baltimore, and New Orleans, are deploying
smart grid technologies and systems.5 According to the US Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), more than 45.8 million smart
meters were installed across the nation by July 2013, covering more
than a third of all US electrical customers.6 More smart meters are
being installed every day.
7
The term "smart grid" encompasses a vast network of controls,
communications, automation, and new technology working together to
make the energy sector greener, more efficient, more reliable, and
more secure. But for most people, it is symbolized by one thing: the
smart meter. Installed in place of traditional, mechanical meters,
digital smart meters do more than simply record the number of
kilowatt-hours used by a customer each month. They break down
energy usage into smaller discrete periods of time and open a channel
of communication between the customer and the utility company.
This information helps households cut energy costs and increases
reliability by providing utilities with more information about how
much electricity is being used throughout their service areas.
However, privacy concerns are inspiring powerful pockets of
resistance to smart meter installation around the country, making it
increasingly difficult for states and municipalities to reap the benefits
of this much-needed technology. Utility workers in Pennsylvania are
calling widespread smart meter installation "a plot by Obama to spy
on us." Echoing similar concerns, the city of Ojai, California, declared
a moratorium on smart meter installation in May 2012.9 In Illinois,
an outspoken citizen group sued for an injunction to halt smart meter
installations on Fourth Amendment grounds.10 In Texas, one woman
sites/default/files/doc/files/sgig-progress-report-final-submitted-07-16-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HG3M-LM3R].
5. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY DELIVERY,
MUNICIPAL UTILITIES' INVESTMENT IN SMART GRID TECHNOLOGIES IMPROVES SERVICES AND
LOWERS COSTS 1 (Oct. 2014), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/10/f18/SG-UtilityInvestment-
Oct2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PNH-TMU3].
6. See FERC, Assessment of Demand Response and Advanced Metering, FERC Staff
Report, 3 (Dec. 2014), http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2014/demand-response.pdf
[https://perma.cc/439T-A4Ff].
7. Id.
8. Christina Nunez, Who's Watching? Privacy Concerns Persist as Smart Meters Roll
Out, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2012), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/
energy/2012/12/121212 -smart- meter-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/85QP-FYH9].
9. See Ojai, Cal., Ordinance No. 823, § 1 (May 29, 2012).
10. See Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 69 F. Supp. 3d 830
(N.D. Ill. 2014).
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even pulled a gun on a utility employee trying to install a smart meter
on her property.1 1
Though smart meters are not, in fact, a domestic espionage
scheme, they do raise important questions: If households are
communicating with the power grid, what exactly will be revealed?
Perhaps more importantly, who will be listening?
This Note proceeds in five Parts. Part II weighs the
revolutionary potential and associated privacy concerns of the smart
grid. Part III examines the privacy protections in place to protect
personal smart meter data. Part IV analyzes state approaches to
improving the energy grid without sacrificing individual privacy. Part
V argues for a reframing of the privacy debate and proposes federal
legislation, modeled after Colorado's regulatory framework as the
optimal means of balancing privacy and energy concerns. Part VI
concludes.
II. THE SMART GRID: TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ELECTRICITY
DISTRIBUTION
Smart meters are integral to the health of our current electric
grid and are critical to a reliable, affordable, and efficient energy
economy. However, smart meter technology raises important privacy
concerns, as it can be used to reveal personal information about life
within a home to government actors, often without the homeowner's
explicit consent.
A. Smart Grid: Solution to a Broken System
The United States' energy grid was designed more than a
century ago. As the country's demand for energy continues to increase
dramatically in both quantity and complexity, the current grid is
desperately in need of an upgrade.12  The existing energy
infrastructure has proven embarrassingly inadequate in the face of
extreme weather events, threats of cyber attacks, and the need to
11. See Charlie Wells, Houston Woman Thelma Taormina Pulls Gun on Electric
Company Worker for Trying to Install 'Smart Meter', N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 19, 2012, 6:25 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/houston-woman-thelma-taormina-pulls-gun-electric-
company-worker-install- smart- meter-article- 1.1118051 [https://perma.ccY6VY-U3GR].
12. The American Society of Civil Engineers recently gave US energy infrastructure a
D+ grade, citing the grid's advanced age as a key concern. Am. Soc'y of Civil Eng'rs, 2013 Report
Card for America's Infrastructure 1 (2013), http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/
documents/Energy.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BRB-Y27P]. Our current electric grid was conceived at
a time when homes had only small energy demands, such as a few light bulbs and a radio, and
much of our generation, transmission, and distribution facilities date back as far as the 1880s.
Id.
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revolutionize our energy consumption to combat climate change.13
The "smart grid" uses digital age technology to profoundly change the
electric power grid in much the same way that business, education,
and entertainment have changed with the advent of the Internet and
other transformative technology.14 Smart technology can be used to
update our ailing electric grid making it more reliable, secure, and
efficient.
The existing electricity grid is increasingly unreliable. This is
correlated with the increasing regularity of power outages in the
United States: there have been five massive blackouts over the past
forty years-three of which happened in the past decade.1 5 These
outages have broader implications than simply waiting for the lights
to come on: plant production stops, perishable food spoils, traffic lights
go dark, and credit card transactions are rendered inoperable.1
6
Outages and reliability issues are estimated to cost American
businesses more than $100 billion each year.17 The increase in
blackouts and brownouts is due, in large part, to slow response times
of mechanical switches, a lack of automated analytics, and a lack of
situational awareness on the part of grid operators.1 8 Currently,
utilities only learn of a power outage when a customer calls to report
it.19 The smart grid enables utilities to identify outages, their cause,
and the customers affected as soon as they occur.20 This allows
utilities to quickly reroute electricity to customers and reduce the
impact of an outage.21 Advanced smart grid technology also allows
utilities to monitor the health of the grid proactively, allowing them to
repair pending faults in advance and avoid outages.
22
The current electric grid is also vulnerable to cyber attack.
Technologically, electric utilities are about a decade behind financial
13. See id.
14. See Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2013).
15. See Sudeen G. Kelly, Effectively Transforming our Electric Delivery System to a
Smart Grid: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Environment of the Comm. on Science &
Technology, l1lth Cong. (2010), http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendarFiles/20090723104313-
Kelly%20Smart%2OGrid%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/TNA2-V5H7].
16. The Northeast blackout of 2003 resulted in a $6 billion economic loss to the region.
See id.
17. Litos Strategic Comm'n, The Smart Grid: An Introduction, U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY 6
(2008).
18. Samuel J. Harvey, Smart Meters, Smarter Regulation: Balancing Privacy and
Innovation in the Electric Grid, 61 UCLA L. REV. 2068, 2072-73 (2014).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 2073; Stephanie M. Stern, Smart-Grid: Technology and the Psychology of
Environmental Behavior Change, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 139, 144 (2011).
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and telecommunications industries when it comes to protecting
against cyber hackers. Utilities across the country, and around the
world, have seen a significant increase in deliberate attacks that could
throw thousands of customers into the dark.23 In April 2009, The Wall
Street Journal reported that cyber spies had infiltrated the US electric
grid and left behind software that could be used to disrupt the
system.24 According to the Journal, the hackers, stemming from
China, Russia, and other nations, were on a phishing expedition to
map out our electric system.25 The interdependencies of various grid
components present the risk of a cascading series of failures that could
bring our nation's banking, communications, traffic, and security
systems to a halt. While some worry that as the number of digital
touch points increases, potential vulnerability to cyber attacks
likewise increases. The smart grid can actually keep the electrical
system more secure because it senses trouble earlier, sends in cyber
troops to protect data, and diverts power around trouble spots.
26
Moreover, smart grid technology increases efficiency by
decreasing both the amount of electricity consumed and the amount
lost in transition. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA)
predicts that the deployment of a national smart grid system could
reduce electricity demand by as much as 38 to 48 percent.27 Smart
meters provide real-time demand information, enabling utilities to
produce only as much energy as needed, thereby minimizing surplus,
as energy is lost unless consumed upon generation. This information
also reduces peak load provisions, decreasing the need for "peaker
plants," the oldest, dirtiest, most dangerous plants that only come
online when demand is highest.28 Moreover, consumer access to smart
meter data enables consumers to make smarter, more efficient, and
more cost-effective energy consumption choices.
In short, upgrading to a smart grid benefits consumers,
utilities, businesses, and society as a whole. It achieves
environmental goals at lower costs than the traditional grid, enables
23. Eric Niiler, Energy Grid: Safe From Cyber Attack?, DISCOVERY NEWSLETTER (May 9,
2012, 3:00 AM), http://news.discovery.com/tech/apps/smart-grid-cyber-attacks-1 10901.htm
[https://perma.cc/TM9P-9GHA].
24. Siobhan Gorman, Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated By Spies, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8,
2009, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123914805204099085 [https://perma.cc/UGP6-
HYHQ].
25. Id. Phishing is typically characterized by an attempt to acquire sensitive
information, such as usernames and passwords, often for malicious reasons, by masquerading as
a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication.
26. A small attack happening in one place will be easier to isolate, and other resources
can be brought to bear, minimizing the damage that the bad guys are intending. See id.
27. See Stern, supra note 22, at 145.
28. See id. at 143-44.
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us to respond more quickly to natural and man-made outages, and
operates more efficiently and reliably.
B. So Smart It's Scary: Potential for Government Overreach
As previously stated, smart meters generate individual privacy
concerns because consumption data can be used to reveal personal
details about life within a home. While traditional analog meters
record monthly energy consumption as a single lump sum figure,
smart meters collect between 750 and 3,000 distinct time-stamped
data points per month.29 Typical smart meters record energy usage
every fifteen minutes, while advanced versions may shrink this
window to as few as six seconds or even permit measurement in real
time.30 Individual appliances increasingly have unique energy
consumption patterns. For example, a refrigerator draws power in a
different way than a television, a respirator, or a marijuana grow
light.31 As a result, there is a concern that these data may be
aggregated over time and analyzed to reveal personal information
including medical conditions, illicit habits, or other private details
about a person's home life. 32
Consequently, utility customers and privacy advocates have
expressed concerns about law enforcement access to smart meter
data.33  Smart meter data present a potential new tool for law
enforcement to investigate a broad set of crimes and even track
people's whereabouts. Law enforcement could use smart meter data
as either direct or circumstantial evidence for any number of crimes.
They have the potential to be used to identify marijuana grow houses,
sweat shops, brothels, or to detect violations of housing ordinances or
zoning regulations. The data can also be used to uncover fraud,
substantiate or disprove an alibi, or suggest whether a home's
residents conspired to commit a crime.
34
29. Jack I. Lerner & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Taking the Long View of the Fourth
Amendment: Stored Records and the Sanctity of the Home, 2008 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 3 (2008).
30. See Sonia K. McNeil, Note, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
199, 204 (2011).
31. See Jian Liang et al., Load Signature Study-Part I: Basic Concept, Structure, and
Methodology, 25 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER DELIVERY 551, 551 (2010).
32. See, e.g., McNeil, supra note 30, at 204-05.
33. See, e.g., Ojai, Cal., Ordinance No. 823, § 1 (May 29, 2012); Naperville Smart Meter
Awareness v. City of Naperville, 69 F. Supp. 3d 830, 836 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Nunez, supra note 8;
Wells, supra note 11.
34. See Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications of Smart Meters, 86 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 161, 171 (2011) (suggesting that smart meter data could be used to frustrate a
reimbursement claim for a medical device you are not actually using, to show you were home on
a certain night, or that your home security system was disarmed at the time of a burglary).
2016] 885
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These concerns are not unfounded. In the United States, there
is a history of voluntary utility compliance with government requests
to share personal consumer usage information.35 In some areas of the
country, law enforcement already uses energy consumption data to
investigate potential illegal activities. In Texas, a police detective
used individual energy data obtained from a public utility company to
identify residential marijuana growing operations.36 Similarly, in
California, law enforcement officers obtained a warrant to search a
family home for evidence of marijuana production based on an
unusually high electric bill. 37 In both cases, the alleged data mining
focused on above-average overall electricity consumption.38 Smart
meter data could allow for much more focused investigations, as
consumption could potentially be tracked by appliance or time of day.
The increasing amount of personal information readily
available to the government poses significant problems with
far-reaching social effects. Inadequately constrained government
information gathering can result in the "slow creep toward a
totalitarian state.'39 This makes individuals particularly vulnerable
to government misuse of personal information during times of crisis.40
There is a concern that insufficient privacy protections chill
"democratic activities and interfer[e] with individual self
determination.'41 Concerns such as these engender public outcry and
community bans on smart meter technology.
42
However, the fact that smart meter data, like many other kinds
of personal information, can-and often do-flow to the government
should not necessarily prevent their collection and use.43 It is critical
for environmental and energy regulators to have access to these data
to maximize the potential of our energy system. For present purposes,
what is important is that potential abuses are mitigated where
35. See id. at 172 (discussing telephone companies' willingness to share consumers'
personal phone records with law enforcement after the 9/11 attacks).
36. See Jordan Smith, APD Pot-Hunters Are Data-Mining at AE, AUSTIN CHRONICLE
(Nov. 16, 2007), http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2007-11-16/561535/ [https://perma.cc/
B4DJ-7K9E].
37. See Balough, supra note 34, at 171.
38. See id. at 172; Smith, supra note 36.
39. See Katrina Fischer Kuh, Personal Environmental Information: The Promise and
Perils of the Emerging Capacity to Identify Individual Environmental Harms, 65 VAND. L. REV.
1565, 1600-01 (2012).
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See, e.g., Ojai, Cal., Ordinance No. 823, § 1 (May 29, 2012); Naperville Smart Meter
Awareness v. City of Naperville, 69 F. Supp. 3d 830, 836 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Nunez, supra note 8;
Wells, supra note 11.
43. See Nunez, supra note 8.
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possible and otherwise accounted for when balancing privacy concerns
with societal goals.
C. It Takes a Village: Smart Meter Installation as a Collective Action
Problem
Smart grid technologies have a public good dimension due to
the societal benefits-like efficiency, reliability, and security-that
can be achieved and the inability to exclude electricity users from
enjoying these benefits. Privacy concerns create incentives to free ride
on smart meter data provided by neighbors. Energy consumers can
free ride by opting out of smart meter installation and choosing to
retain their traditional analog meters while continuing to enjoy the
benefits of a smart grid.
Like flu shots, smart meters give off positive externalities. The
more people who install them, the more efficient the smart grid
becomes. This results in fewer blackouts, more reliable electricity, a
greener planet, and economic savings for both consumers and utilities.
Similarly, the costs imposed by failing to adopt smart meters are
largely public. Free riders impose costs on the system, both in the
form of imperfect data collection and, more concretely, in the form of a
meter reader, who comes to their home each month to maintain and
monitor the traditional meter. Inability to exclude certain consumers
from the modern grid means those who opt out still benefit from the
data shared by friends and neighbors without having to bear any of
the risks of sharing their own data.
Due to concerns about privacy, all over the country individuals,
communities, and even entire states are opting out, imposing
enormous costs on our energy system while continuing to share in the
benefits the smart grid provides.
III. LEGAL PROTECTION: SMART METER DATA AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
In order to help develop new regulatory regimes to address
these privacy concerns, we should look to existing rules and legal
structures governing access to similar data. The Fourth Amendment
provides the primary means of balancing individual privacy with the
government's legitimate need to access information. The Fourth
Amendment sets limits on law enforcement's investigatory powers,
20161 887
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including its ability to obtain data.44 The Supreme Court interprets
Fourth Amendment privacy protections in terms of "reasonable
expectations";45 however, the application of reasonable expectations of
privacy to emerging technology has proven exceedingly difficult. 46
Importantly, the Supreme Court has consistently found that
individuals can have no reasonable expectation of privacy for
information willingly conveyed to third parties.47 This reasoning,
termed the "third-party doctrine," has been extended by the Court to
include information customers provide to businesses, including
utilities.48  In contrast, however, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
affirmed the importance of the home as the location afforded the most
privacy under the Fourth Amendment.
49
A. A Man's Home Is His Castle
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the warrantless use of
technology to view inside a home. In 2001, the Supreme Court
addressed this issue in Kyllo v. United States.50  In Kyllo, a
government agent viewed a private residence using a thermal imaging
device.5 1 The images revealed interior temperatures consistent with
the presence of marijuana grow lights.52  While a marijuana grow
house was indeed present, the Court found thermal imaging to be an
impermissible warrantless search. To the Court, the use of imaging
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. TV (providing that "the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated").
45. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In Katz,
a defendant was convicted of transmitting wagering information by telephone in violation of a
federal statute. See id. at 348. At trial, the government introduced evidence of telephone
conversations overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording
device to the outside of a telephone booth without obtaining a warrant. See id. The Supreme
Court held the evidence was illegally obtained, explaining, "What a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected." See id. at 351. Consequently, after Katz, the Fourth Amendment
protects objects, activities, and statements from warrantless search where (1) a person exhibits a
subjective expectation of privacy and (2) that expectation is one that society finds objectively
reasonable. See id. at 348, 351; see also id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
46. See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV.
503, 505 (2007).
47. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
48. See, e.g., United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107, 1111-12 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment in
residential electricity usage records).
49. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
50. See generally id.
51. Id. at 29-30.
52. Id. at 30.
888
HOW SMART IS TOO SMART?
technology was, for Fourth Amendment purposes, equivalent to
entering Kyllo's home.53 The Court justified its holding by reasoning
that such technology could disclose intimate details about personal
activities, including "at what hour each night the lady of the house
takes her daily sauna and bath."54 Justice Scalia opined that the
Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the house.
55
However, in the majority opinion, Justice Scalia also specified
that "intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, constitutes a
search-at least where ... the technology in question is not in general
public use."56 This caveat suggests that if a technology for seeing
inside a house is in "general public use," then that technology might
invalidate societal willingness to accept the individual's expectation of
privacy as reasonable.
B. Third-Party Doctrine
Traditionally, courts have applied a two-part inquiry to decide
whether data shared with a third party receive Fourth Amendment
protection. First, the court asks if the individual actually exhibited an
expectation of privacy. If so, the next question is whether the
subjective expectation of privacy is one that society recognizes as
reasonable. For information shared with a third party, the Court's
answer to the second question has uniformly been "no." 57
The Supreme Court has "consistently held that a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy regarding information that he
voluntarily turns over to third parties."58 The foundational Supreme
Court challenge to the practice on Fourth Amendment grounds is
found in On Lee v. United States.5 9 This case established that law
enforcement does not violate the Fourth Amendment by using third
parties to obtain information without first seeking a warrant.
6 0
According to the Court, the Fourth Amendment was only designed to
protect reasonable expectations, not "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief
53. See id. at 40.
54. Id. at 38.
55. Id. at 40 (the line protecting privacy of the home "must be not only firm but also
bright").
56. Id. at 34.
57. See McNeil, supra note 30, at 213 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44
(1979)).
58. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
59. See generally On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
60. See id.
2016] 889
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that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not
reveal it." '61
This misplaced belief rationale was subsequently extended to
business records. In United States v. Miller, the Court refused to
suppress bank records that corroborated a defendant's intent to
defraud the government of taxes owed on an illegal moonshine
operation.62 In revealing his affairs to the bank, the Court held that
the defendant assumed the risk that his information would be shared
with law enforcement.
63
Using the same reasoning, lower courts have held that there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the data contained in electric
utility records.6 4  Courts reason that because there is no privacy
interest in records kept in the course of a business, under Miller,
individuals cannot challenge law enforcement's acquisition of various
types of information such as bank records, credit card statements, and
cell phone records.6 5 Thus, under the third-party doctrine, consumers
seemingly have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the smart
meter data contained in electric utility records either.
However, academics are increasingly advocating for a
reframing of third-party doctrine as a doctrine of consent.66 These
advocates recognize that the third-party doctrine makes two
assumptions: first, that there was a choice to disclose information to a
third party; and second, that the consent to disclose information to a
third party remains viable even if the third party permits the
government, to whom no consent was given, to access the data.
Framed instead as a doctrine of consent, the second question becomes
"did the person's choice to disclose information to a third party
constitute consent to a search by law enforcement?"67 Viewed in this
light, the answer may not always be yes.
61. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
62. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437-43 (1976).
63. See id. at 442, 447 (reaffirming that "a person has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties"); see, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at
744-45; Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 752 (1971); Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302; Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 434 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (D. Or. 2006); Samson
v. State, 919 P.2d 171, 173 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996); People v. Dunkin, 888 P.2d 305, 308 (Colo.
App. 1994); Booker v. Dominion Va. Power, No. 3:09CV759, 2010 WL 1848474, at *9-10 (E.D.
Va. May 7, 2010).
65. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
66. See McNeil, supra note 30, at 216.
67. See id.
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C. The Naperville Holding
Courts have repeatedly held that citizens have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the aggregate measurements of their
electrical usage.68 In September 2014, the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois explicitly expanded this holding to include
smart meter data.
69
In 2012, a public utility serving the small city of Naperville,
Illinois, began replacing customers' analog electricity meters with
smart meters as part of a local program called the Naperville Smart
Grid Initiative ("Initiative"), an SGIG program.70 The Initiative did
not include an avenue for customers to keep their traditional analog
meters, requiring all electricity customers to have a smart meter
installed so the city's electric utility and residents could maximize
benefits from the Initiative.71 The newly installed smart meters
increased the frequency of meter readings from once a month to once
every fifteen minutes.72 These data were used by the city to increase
cost efficiency, conserve energy, and optimize the performance of the
local energy grid.7 3
The plaintiff, Naperville Smart Meter Awareness (NSMA), is
an Illinois not-for-profit corporation whose stated mission is to
"educate, engage and empower families, friends and neighbors to
advocate for a fiscally responsible and safe utility meter solution in
Naperville, Illinois. '74 NSMA alleged that smart meters present
privacy risks because a home's smart meter data history reveals
"intimate details about residents' personal lives and living habits.' 75
Thus, NSMA claimed that Naperville's collection of detailed smart
meter data constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment and sought an injunction.76
In September 2014, the federal district court dismissed
NSMA's Fourth Amendment claim. The court held that there is no
68. See, e.g., United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107, 1111-13 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment in
residential electricity usage records).
69. See generally Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 69 F. Supp.
3d 830, 841 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
70. See id. at 835.
71. Naperville Smart Grid Initiative, Question/Response Inventory 6 (Mar. 25, 2013),
http://www.naperville.il.us/emplibrary/Smart Grid/NSGIQuestionResponselnventory.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5D36-7BP9].
72. See id.
73. See id at 6, 8, 22-23.
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id. at 5.
76. See id. at 15-16.
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reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment
in residential electricity usage records, even in smart meter data.77
The court reasoned that smart meters do not convey any information
in which residents have a reasonable expectation of privacy.78
According to the court, even if a graph displaying a home's total power
usage for one day shows a peak in usage around 7:00 PM, a person
inspecting the data might infer that someone was home at that time.79
However, that same inference could also be reasonably made by any
member of the public walking by the residence who notices a car in the
driveway or lights in the window.80 Thus, the data provided by smart
meters are not information that can reasonably be expected to remain
private.81 While this was only a district court decision, it is the only
decision on smart meters to date. Thus, although it is not binding on
other courts, it is likely indicative of how other courts will view smart
meter data under the Fourth Amendment.
IV. WALKING THE TIGHT-ROPE: BALANCING PRIVACY NEEDS AND
SMART GRID GOALS
Every day, our energy grid is becoming more reliant on smart
meter data.8 2 Better information regarding household energy usage is
improving meaningful efforts by utilities and regulators to improve
the efficiency and reliability of our energy system.8 3 However, the
ultimate success or failure of the smart grid hinges on customer
acceptance.8 4  While the majority of meters installed by utilities
receive little customer resistance, the demands of a small, but very
vocal, coalition of customers have had a significant impact on
regulatory policy. Despite the tremendous need for smart meters,
77. See Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 69 F. Supp. 3d 830,
841 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
78. See id. ("Because NSMA has not alleged that the City is collecting any information
that is more detailed than aggregate usage measurements, or that is otherwise entitled to
protection under the Fourth Amendment, NSMA has failed to state a claim for unreasonable
search and seizure.").
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See Smart Meter Deployments Continue to Rise, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 1,
2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=8590 [https://perma.cc/82N6-LXZV].
83. See supra Section II.A.
84. See Beth Karlin, Public Acceptance of Smart Meters: Integrating Psychology and
Practice, in ACEEE SUMMER STUDY ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN BUILDINGS: FUELING OUR
FUTURE WITH EFFICIENCY 1 (2012), http://www.aceee.org/files/proceedings/2012/
data/papers/0193-000243.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G2X-8HV7] ('Public acceptance of utility
programs and initiatives is vital for efficient deployment. Consumer complaints, protests, and
lawsuits, can significantly impede progress and cost utilities, cities, and taxpayers money.").
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grassroots opposition has spread across the United States, leaving a
trail of opt-out policies in its wake.8 5 In order to maximize the
potential of this new technology, regulators must balance these
privacy concerns with smart grid goals.
A. Failure of the Fourth
Academics have suggested that the sanctity of the home in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, coupled with the level of detailed
information about the interior of a home revealed by smart meters,
may be sufficient to overcome the third-party doctrine.8 6  If law
enforcement were to collect smart meter data directly, it could
arguably be considered a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Like thermal imaging in Kyllo, smart meters may be
used to reveal personal information about the interior of a home and
the lives of its residents.8 7 In fact, smart meter data can even be used
to determine "at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her
daily sauna and bath."88
Others suggest that if the third-party doctrine is viewed as a
doctrine of consent, Fourth Amendment protections could be applied
to some forms of smart meter data.8 9  For many categories of
information, sharing is clearly a deliberate choice. For smart meter
data, however, this "choice" is harder to find when customers are left
without the option of retaining their traditional analog meter. Living
without basic utility services, such as electricity or water, is akin to
keeping one's savings under a mattress, rather than in a bank.90
While it may be possible, it is not within the realm of the normal. In
states with extreme temperatures, living without basic utility services
may actually be impossible at times.91 In this context, the choice to
share information with a third party is the choice to turn on the
furnace, the lights, the refrigerator, or the respirator. It is, in other
words, not very much of a choice at all.
In practice, however, smart meter data is probably not
protected by the Fourth Amendment. While the Supreme Court has
85. See, e.g., Ojai, Cal., Ordinance No. 823, § 1 (May 29, 2012); Naperville, 69 F. Supp.
3d at 841; Nunez, supra note 8; Wells, supra note 11.
86. Brandon J. Murrill et al., Cong. Research Serv., R42338, Smart Meter Data: Privacy
and Cybersecurity 3 (2012), http://www.fas.orglsgp/crs/misc/R42338.pdf [https://perma.cc/424F-
2V7Y]; see Harvey, supra note 18, at 2068.
87. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001).
88. Id. at 40.
89. See McNeil, supra note 30, at 216.
90. See id.
91. For this reason, "cold weather rules" limit a utility's ability to cut off service during
some months, even to a non-paying customer in some states. See id. at 217.
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not explicitly applied the third-party doctrine in this instance, lower
court decisions have repeatedly extended the doctrine to utility
records, strongly implying that the doctrine extends to smart meter
data.92 Moreover, smart meter data may not be protected even if the
third-party doctrine did not apply. Justice Scalia's dicta in Kyllo
seemingly states that if technology for seeing inside a house is in
"general public use," then its use does not constitute a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.93 As smart meters become more prevalent,
already occupying more than a quarter of American households,94 it is
foreseeable that society could find the expectation unreasonable that
one's electricity-consuming activities inside the home would remain
private.
Ultimately, the Naperville decision appears to be the last nail
in the coffin for any hope that the Fourth Amendment is sufficient to
protect individual smart meter data.95 The court directly addressed
the granular nature of smart meter data and the personal details that
can be inferred from such a detailed data set and still found it
insufficient to warrant a reasonable expectation of privacy.96 As a
result, Congress must extend protection beyond that provided by the
Fourth Amendment by creating legislation and regulations designed
to better address the privacy concerns presented by smart meter data
while maintaining clear procedures for law enforcement to follow in
order to gain access to customer information.
B. Laboratories of Experimentation
On the state level, several legislatures and Public Utility
Commissions (PUCs) have enacted a variety of rules and regulations
designed to balance these competing objectives. New Hampshire's
smart meter deployment policy prohibits utilities from installing
smart meters without the express written consent of the customer.
Vermont, meanwhile, encourages statewide smart meter adoption, but
allows customers to opt out at any time. California also encourages
statewide adoption of smart meters, but charges a monthly fee to
92. See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 434 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (D. Or. 2006); Samson
v. State, 919 P.2d 171, 173 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996); People v. Dunkin, 888 P.2d 305, 308 (Colo.
App. 1994); Booker v. Dominion Va. Power, No. CIVA. 3:09CV759, 2010 WL 1848474, at *5 (E.D.
Va. May 7, 2010).
93. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
94. See Smart Meter Deployments Continue to Rise, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.: TODAY
IN ENERGY (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=8590
[https://perma.cc/QF5R-AS2S].
95. See Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 69 F. Supp. 3d 830,
841 (N.D. ill. 2014).
96. See id.
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customers who decide to opt out. While these state opt-out policies
serve to protect citizens from real and imagined threats to their
privacy, they also serve to undermine the ultimate goals of the
Recovery Act and thwart the implementation of the much-needed
smart grid.
1. New Hampshire's Consent Model
Implemented in 2012, New Hampshire has one of the most
restrictive approaches to smart meter deployment. The New
Hampshire approach is very effective at preserving the privacy of its
citizens by choosing to frame smart meters as the exception, instead of
the rule. Rather than making smart meters the default and allowing
residents an opportunity to opt out, New Hampshire requires
residents to opt in to its smart meter program. In New Hampshire, no
electric utility can install a smart meter without the express written
consent of the customer.97 The state actively discourages installation
by requiring electric utilities to inform homeowners that smart meter
installation is optional and prohibiting the provision of reduced rates
or incentives of any kind for customers who opt to install smart
meters,98 even though smart meters save utilities money by reducing
the need for meter men and increasing grid reliability.
As a result of these restrictive policies, the bulk of New
Hampshire residents do not have to worry about the government
getting ahold of detailed smart meter data without the resident's
knowledge or consent. However, the state fails to protect the privacy
of residents who elect to have smart meters installed. Due to the
stringency of the notice and consent requirements, New Hampshire
residents who consent to smart meter installation have likely waived
their reasonable expectation of privacy under even the modern
iteration of the third-party doctrine because they knowingly consented
to share their personal data with their utility company.
In addition, by deterring smart meter installation, New
Hampshire prevents its residents from reaping the full benefits of the
smart grid.99 Here, the externalities imposed by failing to adopt smart
meters are largely public. While individual privacy is protected, the
associated costs of an aging grid are borne equally by those who
choose to adopt smart meters and those who do not. By discouraging
97. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 374:62 II(a) (LexisNexis 2012) ("No electric utility that
sells or provides electricity within the state of New Hampshire shall install a smart meter
gateway device on or in a person's home or business without written consent of the person or
persons who own the home or business.").
98. Id. § 374:62 II(b)(2).
99. For a discussion of the benefits of the smart grid, see supra Section II.
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smart meter installation in New Hampshire, the state is unduly
burdening residents who consent to installation as well as neighboring
northeastern states who share both energy infrastructure and
environmental impacts.
In sum, the New Hampshire model provides strong privacy
protections for many of its citizens, but at a high cost to both its
residents and its neighbors.
2. Vermont's Voluntary Opt-Out Program
Vermont is a perfect foil of New Hampshire-geographically,
politically, and in terms of its smart meter policy. In Vermont, smart
meters are treated as the norm, rather than the exception.
Predictably, the result is a much higher level of smart meter adoption
than seen in New Hampshire.100 Consequently, all residents reap the
benefits of the smart grid, even those who chose not to have a smart
meter installed.
The Vermont Energy Act of 2012 specifies that utility
companies transitioning to smart meters must: (1) provide prior
written notice to customers indicating that the meter will use radio or
other wireless means for two-way communication with the utility, (2)
offer a free opt-out option at the time of installation, and (3) allow
customers to request removal of a previously installed smart meter for
any reason without incurring any charge for removal.101
While the state has made a concerted effort to improve its
electric grid, like New Hampshire, it has not placed much emphasis on
protecting the privacy of its residents who share their smart meter
data with their utilities. The Vermont approach likely waives all
Fourth Amendment protection. Those with smart meters likely have
no reasonable expectation of privacy, as the technology is in general
public use in the state, and they are informed annually that they are
sharing their data with a third party. Given the notice requirement,
consumers likely also consent to share their data with the government
under this policy.
Nonetheless, the state does protect the privacy of those who
express concerns by mandating an easy opt-out option.10 2 Customers
may choose not to have smart meters installed at no additional cost.10 3
Thus, customers and communities concerned about their privacy have
100. See H. Russell Frisby Jr. et al., Report of the Demand-Side Resources & Smart Grid
Committee, 34 ENERGY L.J. 373, 386 (2013) ("Florida, Texas, Vermont, and the West lead the
nation with over 30% advanced metering penetration based on 2012 data.").
101. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 2811 (2012).
102. See id.
103. See id.
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a form of recourse. Moreover, the statute permits entire communities
to opt out, as seen in Ojai, California.10
4
While this freedom is intended to provide a refuge for those
worried about government access to personal data, it is also a useful
tool for vocal dissenters to impose community-wide opt outs on entire
towns or regions, which can have devastating effects on the
proliferation of the smart grid. The Vermont model's lack of privacy
protection for smart meter data and ease of opt-out procedures create
a recipe for debilitating customer resistance to installation by
facilitating free riding. Inability to exclude certain consumers from
the modern grid means those who opt out still benefit from the data
shared by friends and neighbors without bearing any of the risks.10 5
3. California's Price of Privacy Model
Due in large part to the pressing energy crisis, California has a
particularly aggressive plan for smart grid adoption. Like Vermont,
California makes smart meter installation the norm. However,
California goes two steps further: (1) customers who choose to opt out
of the smart meter program are charged a monthly fee,10 6 and (2) local
governments may not collectively opt out of smart meter programs on
behalf of residents in their jurisdictions.10 7  The result is almost
universal adoption and one of the most successful smart grid
programs in the country.108
By imposing a fee on those who opt out, California attempts to
force would-be free riders to internalize the costs they impose on the
system. In 2014, the costs of opting out were updated to reflect the
104. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; Ojai, Cal., Ordinance No. 823, § 1 (May 29,
2012); id.
105. Again, these free riders impose costs on the system, both in the form of imperfect
data collection and, more concretely, in the form of a meter reader who has to come to their
homes each month to maintain and monitor the traditional meter.
106. Decision Modifying Decision 08-09-039 and Adopting an Opt-Out Program for S.
Cal. Edison Co.'s Edison Smartconnect Program, Decision No. D12-04-018 (Cal. P.U.C. Apr. 19,
2012); Decision Modifying Decision 07-04-043 and Adopting an Opt-Out Program for San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co., Decision No. D12-04-019 (Cal. P.U.C. Apr. 19, 2012); Decision Modifying Pac.
Gas and Elec. Co.'s Smartmeter Program to Include an Opt-Out Option, Decision No. D12-02-014
(Cal. P.U.C. Feb. 1, 2012). Customers participating in the opt-out option are assessed an initial
fee of $75 and a monthly charge of $10 thereafter; however, low-income customers are eligible for
a reduced rate. Id.
107. See Application of Pacific Gas and Electric Co. for Approval of Modifications to its
Smart MeterTM Program and Increased Revenue Requirements to Recover the Costs of the
Modifications (U39M), 2014 Cal. PUC Lexis 637, 4 (Cal. PUC Dec. 18, 2014); Decision Modifying
Decision 07-04-043 and Adopting an Opt-Out Program for San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., No. Dl-
03-015, at 17 (Cal. P.U.C. Apr. 19, 2012).
108. Frisby, supra note 100.
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actual costs borne by the system.10 9 These costs include customer
operations, metering, and information technology. However, they do
not take into account the more abstract costs to the smart grid like
imperfect data or increased inefficiency.110  Nonetheless, after
reviewing their findings, the California PUC still found that the
imposition of costs associated with the opt-out program on opt-out
customers would result in almost doubling their utility bills.111 In an
attempt to balance the appropriate allocation of costs with the need to
set fees at a level that does not unreasonably deter customers from
electing the opt-out option, the California PUC instituted a cap on fees
imposed on opt-out customers and spread the rest of the costs evenly
among all California households.
112
Like the Vermont approach, this model has been very
successful in maximizing smart grid potential and mitigating the
impact of free riders. However, it still leaves its residents vulnerable
to invasions of privacy. Not only are smart meter data not protected
by the state, the California approach likely waives all Fourth
Amendment protection. People with smart meters likely have no
reasonable expectation of privacy because the technology is in general
use, they are informed annually that they are sharing their data with
a third party, and they have an opportunity to opt out-all of which
likely amounts to consent. As a result, there is a sense of
dissatisfaction among residents, although dissenters have very few
means of mobilizing resistance.113
4. Colorado: Controlled Distribution Model
The Colorado model is unique because it regulates distribution
of smart meter data, instead of smart meter installation. In Colorado,
utilities are authorized to use customer data exclusively in
furtherance of predefined smart grid goals.114 Otherwise, utilities may
not disclose customer data to third parties, including government
agents, without the customer's written consent.11 5 This ensures that
109. California electric utilities estimate the total opt-out program costs over $60 million
per year. See U39M, 2014 Cal. PUC LEXIS 637 at 5, 8, 53.
110. See id. at 53.
111. See id. at 57.
112. See id.
113. CA Local Governments On Board, STOP SMART METERS! (Feb. 27, 2015),
http://stopsmartmeters.org/how-you-can-stop-smart-meters/sample-letter-to-local-government/ca-
local-governments-on-board! [https://perma.cc/6UCN-36S3] (listing fifty-seven local governments
in California that are opposed to the mandatory smart meter program).
114. 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3029 (LexisNexis 2016).
115. Id. § 723-3:3030.
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customer-specific data are used exclusively for purposes that align
with consumers' reasonable expectations.
The Colorado PUC also calibrates protection measures to the
level of risk posed by different types of data.116 Utilities can share
aggregated data with third parties as long as no individual customer
can be identified from the aggregated amount.117 To ensure individual
smart meter data are sufficiently aggregated, Colorado requires at
least fifteen customers to be included in each group and specifies that
no single customer can account for more than 15 percent of that
group.118
The Colorado policy is laudable because it protects tiered
reasonable expectations of privacy without sacrificing smart grid
potential. Like in California and Vermont, smart meter installation is
the norm. But, the Colorado model is unique because the state
protects consumers' reasonable expectations of privacy regardless of
whether they opt to have smart meters installed or not. Because
government access to the data is highly regulated, citizens are less
concerned about the potential for government overreach and less
likely to opt out as individuals or as a community. With these
distribution protections in place, privacy concerns should be mitigated
for many customers, resulting in widespread smart meter adoption
and ushering our grid into the twenty-first century without sacrificing
consumer privacy.
These different models provide a helpful framework through
which to analyze how best to achieve both privacy and regulatory
goals. Comparatively, the New Hampshire model is the most
restrictive. It provides strong privacy protections for its citizens at the
expense of modernization of the electric grid. In Vermont, smart
meters are treated as the norm, but residents are allowed to opt out at
no additional cost, resulting in a much higher level of smart meter
adoption.1 9 California also makes smart meter adoption the default,
but imposes a fee on those who opt out in an attempt to force those
who do to bear the costs of their decisions. Finally, the Colorado
model is unique because it regulates distribution of smart meter data,
rather than installation. Each of these states provides an insight into
the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches, which are
helpful in identifying the best model for states and the nation as a
whole going forward.
116. See generally 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3 (LexisNexis 2016).
117. See 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3031(a) (LexisNexis 2016).
118. See id.
119. See Frisby, supra note 100, at 386 ("Florida, Texas, Vermont, and the West lead the
nation with over 30% advanced metering penetration based on 2012 data.").
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V. REFRAMING THE ISSUE
Government access to smart meter data is critical to effective
regulation of our energy system. It is imperative to facilitate some
government access for reliability, efficiency, and security purposes.
Yet, unfettered access to smart meter data seems unlikely and ill
advised. It opens the door for government overreach and invasion of
privacy, to say nothing of citizen discontent and resistance. In states
like New Hampshire, opportunities for the smart grid to flourish are
frustrated by the adoption of privacy policies developed without
recognition of the need to preserve or facilitate such access.
Meanwhile, if no or inadequate restrictions on government access are
in place, privacy concerns inspire a backlash that precludes smart grid
proliferation.120
The third-party doctrine most likely eliminates Fourth
Amendment protections for an individual's smart meter data.121 This
lack of protection has prompted many fearful utility customers to balk
at smart meter installation, delaying or derailing smart grid progress.
The time has come for federal regulation.
A. A Job for Congress
In lieu of constitutional protection, congressional egislation is
the best way to protect privacy and maximize smart grid potential.
Congress has already recognized the smart grid as a national priority,
as seen by its heavy investment through the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009.122 Moreover, the health and security of the
electrical system directly impact national security, the national
economy, and our environment.
Congress is more than qualified for such a task. It has a long
history of addressing threats to privacy exploited by new technologies,
such as the Telecommunication Act's restrictions on disclosure of
customer proprietary network information and the Right to Financial
Privacy Act's constraints on disclosure of consumer bank records. 123
Congress is better suited for this task than are state or local
governments. A more local approach to regulation may allow
120. This is evidenced by customer and community refusal of smart meter devices
hindering the progress of the smart grid. See, e.g., Ojai, Cal., Ordinance No. 823, § 1 (May 29,
2012); Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 69 F. Supp. 3d 830, 836 (N.D. Ill.
2014); Nunez, supra note 8; Wells, supra note 11.
121. See Naperville, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 840.
122. See, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2009) (codified as amended in scattered Sections of 6, 19, 26, 42, and 47 U.S.C.).
123. 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012); 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-21 (2012).
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regulators to tailor privacy controls to the unique energy structures of
each state and to work more closely with public utilities, private
utilities, and PUCs to find the optimal balance between privacy and
smart grid goals. However, as the country moves towards the
adoption of a smart grid, our energy system is becoming increasingly
national in scope, increasing the need for uniform federal regulation.
By taking the lead on privacy protections for smart meter data,
Congress can provide guidance to stakeholders operating in an area of
complex and overlapping interests and regulatory authority.
Congressional guidance on this issue would enjoy support from both
consumers and industry. Utilities will appreciate the federal
government stepping in and establishing a uniform standard.
Utilities that operate in multiple states, in particular, find adherence
to different state regulations onerous.124 For customers, meanwhile,
an uneven patchwork of state and local regulations means that
existing privacy protections are largely a matter of geographic
happenstance. A uniform federal legislation will maximize the
potential of the smart grid by deterring states, like New Hampshire,
from free riding by reaping the benefits of other states' investment in
the smart technology while their own antiquated infrastructures
create an enormous drain on our energy grid.
Further, compared to the federal government, states and PUCs
are ill-equipped to regulate these privacy concerns. Because smart
meter data are transmitted across state lines, the federal government
can regulate them under its Commerce Clause jurisdiction.125
Meanwhile, state public utility commissions cannot assert legal
authority over all potential third-party providers, and state
legislatures are unable to effectively protect privacy beyond their
borders.
B. Regulating Distribution: Adopting the Colorado Model
It is important for people to understand that smart meters are
not, in fact, a plot by the government to spy on us.126 Smart meters
serve an important role in protecting and enhancing our electric grid.
In order to address consumer concerns, the Government must
heighten privacy controls without sacrificing smart grid potential.
124. See, e.g., Mark Seward, Smart Grid Data-The "Wild West" of Privacy Rights,
SPLUNK BLOGS (May 27, 2011), http:/fblogs.splunk.com/2011/05/27/smart- grid-data-thewild-west-
of-privacy-rights [https://perma.cc/E58X-2H6D].
125. See, e.g., Letter from David K. Owens, Exec. Vice President, Edison Elec. Inst. et al.,
to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Energy 10 (July 12, 2010).
126. Nunez, supra note 8. Utility workers in Pennsylvania are calling widespread smart
meter installation "a plot by Obama to spy on us." Id.
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This can be accomplished by shifting the conversation from regulation
of installation to regulation of distribution. Law enforcement's access
to these data defies customers' reasonable expectations and poses the
true threat, which is not the existence and collection of the data
themselves. Utility companies have had access to social security
numbers, bank account information, and addresses for decades;127 yet,
mandatory access to this highly personal information does not elicit
the same kind of panic, because the distribution of this information is
highly regulated. Similarly, regulating access to smart meter data,
rather than focusing on installation, will make the smart meter itself
safer without sacrificing smart grid potential.
Generally, energy utilities are required to obtain customer
consent before disclosing individual billing information.128 Smart
meter data should be similarly regulated. However, there should be a
carve-out for programs necessary to achieve smart grid goals.
Further, aggregated data, which pose only a negligible threat to
privacy, should be subject to fewer privacy constraints. A successful
smart meter data protection regime requires customer consent for the
transmission of customer-specific data to third parties, except in those
instances where third parties are operating under the supervision of
utilities to carry out essential grid operating functions.
Traditionally, personal data are organized into three types:
(1) customer-specific data, (2) customer-specific deidentified data, and
(3) aggregated data representing community level information.129 The
Colorado PUC calibrates protection measures to the level of risk posed
by different types of data in an attempt to maximize the benefits that
disclosure of less sensitive data can offer.130 In doing so, they have
created an effective model that should be replicated on a national
level.
Customer-specific data generate the greatest privacy concern
because they contain personal information that can be traced back to
specific individuals and households. They should be afforded the most
protection.1 31 In Colorado, "a utility is only authorized to use customer
data to provide regulated utility service in the ordinary course of
127. See Balough, supra note 34, at 182.
128. See id. at 181-82.
129. See Harvey, supra note 18, at 2085.
130. See generally 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3 (LexisNexis 2016).
131. This approach has been successfully adopted in Vermont, where eEnergy Vermont
requires consent for disclosure of all customer- specific data. See INST. FOR ENERGY & THE ENV'T,
VT. LAW SCH., CVPS SMARTPOWER: A SMART GRID COLLABORATION IN VERMONT 23 (2012),
http://www-assets.vermontlaw.edu/Assets/iee/CVPS-SmartGrid-Report-Final- 120215.pdf
[https:Hperma.cc/K26J-6T68].
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business."13 2  The Colorado PUC defines "the ordinary course of
business" as "in furtherance of predefined smart grid goals,"133 thus
ensuring that customer specific data are used exclusively for purposes
that align with consumer's reasonable expectations.
Furthermore, in Colorado, a utility may not disclose customer
data to any third party, including a government agent, unless the
customer first submits a signed "consent to disclose customer data
form."134  Once again, the rule creates a narrow exception for
regulators and utility contractors authorizing them to use this data
specifically and exclusively in furtherance of predefined smart grid
goals.135 Otherwise, utilities are not allowed to disclose customer
data, "except as required by law or to comply with Commission
rule."136 As a result, government officials cannot access consumer data
without a warrant, a subpoena, or a court order, further aligning with
reasonable expectations of privacy.
As the name suggests, customer-specific deidentified data are
customer-specific usage data that have been stripped of all personally
identifying information but still indicate single home usage.137 They
should be held to the same standard as consumer-specific data,
because they can be manipulated to reidentify individuals and
households.138 It is impossible to tell if data have been sufficiently
deidentified because the ability to reidentify data is dependent on the
various external databases available to match against smart meter
data.139 Additionally, the technological ability to manipulate data is
132. 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3027(a) (LexisNexis 2016).
133. 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3029 (LexisNexis 2016).
134. 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3031 (LexisNexis 2016).
135. 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3029 (LexisNexis 2016). Under California's privacy
rules, customer- specific data may also be used without consent only for programs necessary to
grid operation that the CPUC, utilities, or third parties under contract with utilities carry out.
All other uses require customer consent. See generally Decision Adopting Rules to Protect the
Privacy and Security of the Electricity Usage Data of the Customers of Pacific Gas and Electric
Company, Southern California Edison Company, and San Diego Gas & Electric Company,
Rulemaking 08-12-2009 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n May 6, 2011),
http:/docs.cpuc.ca.govPublishedDocs/PLTBLISHED/GRAPHICS/140370.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KD8M-FNSF].
136. 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3030(a) (LexisNexis 2016) ('This includes responses to
requests of the Commission, warrants, subpoenas, [or] courts orders.").
137. See Harvey, supra note 18, at 2087.
138. There is a growing consensus that "anonymizing data to sufficiently prevent
reidentification of an individual is almost impossible." See id. at 2088 (quoting Admin. L. J.'s
Ruling Adding Technical Memos to the Record, Rulemaking 08-12-009, at 5 attach. B (Cal. Pub.
Util. Comm'n May 13, 2013), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G0O0/M064/
K670/64670678.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VBC-KJTT]).
139. See Opening Comments of the Electronic Frontier Foundation on Energy Data
Center, Rulemaking 08-12-009, at 9 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Dec. 17, 2012),
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constantly changing, creating a genuine concern that data sufficiently
deidentified today may be reidentifiable tomorrow.140 Consequently,
Colorado recognizes that deidentified data present the same threat to
privacy as customer data and treats them identically.
141
Aggregated data, on the other hand, are generally considered
more secure and, therefore, warrant less protection.142 Aggregated
data are the least invasive because they represent usage at the
community, rather than individual, level.143 As a result, aggregated
data should be exempt from consent requirements.144 In Colorado,
utilities can share aggregated data with third parties as long as the
"utility takes steps to ensure the report is sufficiently anonymous in
its aggregated form so that any individual customer or reasonable
approximation thereof cannot be determined from the aggregated
amount."145  To ensure personally identifying data are sufficiently
aggregated, Colorado employs a fifteen/fifteen rule. Under this rule,
at least fifteen customers must be included in the data, and no single
customer can account for more than 15 percent of the group.
1 46
The Colorado policy is laudable because it protects tiered
reasonable expectations of privacy without sacrificing smart grid
potential. With these distribution protections in place, privacy
concerns should be mitigated for many customers, resulting in
widespread smart meter adoption, ushering our grid into the twenty-
first century without sacrificing consumer privacy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Smart meters are integral to the health of the United States'
current electric grid and are critical to a reliable, affordable, and
efficient energy economy. Effectively implementing smart meters and
smart technology will be critical if the United States is to meet the
challenges posed by its aging electricity infrastructure. Smart meter
technology is creating a new era of consumer behavior geared towards
http://docs.cpuc.ca.govPublishedDocs/Efile/GOOO[M042/K160/42160299.pdf [https:/perma.cc/
TT78-PF7C].
140. See id. at 34.
141. 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3026(a) (LexisNexis 2016).
142. See Harvey, supra note 18, at 2089-90.
143. See id.
144. For example, the California PUC exempts aggregated data that do not contain
personal identifying information; they are specifically exempt from the Commission's Privacy
Rules. See Audrey Lee et al., Energy Data Center Briefing Paper 1 (2012),
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov[NR/rdonlyres/8B05D2C- 9698-4Fl 6-BB2B-DO7E707DA676/0/Energy
DataCenterFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc[M3Y7-YFTD].
145. See 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-3:3032 (LexisNexis 2016).
146. See id.
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efficiency and conservation. Utilities are increasingly able to offer
more affordable, reliable service, and entire new sectors of the
economy are emerging as entrepreneurs recognize opportunities in the
evolving energy arena. Utilities and regulators are increasingly aware
of and able to defend against cyber attacks through situational
awareness of the grid. Finally, a broad range of social benefits,
environmental and otherwise, will be realized through reduced energy
consumption and the introduction of clean energy technologies.
While there are serious potential privacy risks associated with
such a transformation, we must not lose sight of the fact that it is
smart meter data that pose the threat to privacy, not smart meters
themselves. We need to stop trying to limit smart meter installation,
and instead limit how we make the data available. We need to make
conscious choices about who we want accessing the data and how we
want the data to be used. In this way, we can maximize smart grid
goals without sacrificing privacy.
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